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ABSTRACT
The paper studies an idealized gold standard ina two—country
setting. Without flexible national domestic credit expansion (dce)
policies which offset the effect of money demand shocks on international
gold reserves, the gold standard collapses with certainty in finite time
through a speculative selling attack against one of the currencies.
Various policies for postponing a collapse are considered.
When a responsive dce policy eliminates the danger ofa run on a
country's reserves, the exogenous shocks disturbing the system which
previously were reflected in reserve flows, now show up in the behaviour
of the public debt. Unless the primary (non—interest)government
deficit is permitted to respond to these shocks, thepublic debt is
likely to rise (or fall> to unsustainable levels.
For the idealized gold standard analysed in thepaper, viability
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1.Introduction
This paper is a theoretical study of the viability of a fixed
exchange rate regime which for brevity I refer to as a gold standard.
In a two—country world the monetary authority of each country guarantees
the convertibility of its non—interest bearing fiat currency into gold
at a fixed price. There is an exogenously given global stock of gold,
which has no non—monetary uses.I therefore abstract from one feature
of the historical gold standard, under which the international reserve
asset had uses as a private consumption good and as an industrial
intermediate good and raw material, and could itself be produced through
an extractive production process. The essence of 'gold' in this model
is that it is an "outside" non—interest bearing fiduciary asset whose
aggregate quantity is exogenous to each private and public agent in the
global economic system and1 to the system as a whole.
By viability of the gold standard I mean its probability of
survival and the expected duration of its survival. Special attention
is paid to the way in which particular monetary, financial and fiscal
policy actions, or rules, affect the viability of the system.
The paper extends to a two—country setti;ig the single country
analyses of a collapsing managed exchange rate regime by Kruqman £1979),
Flood and Garber [1983, 198'+a, b], Obstfeld E1984a, b, c) and others.
For a more descriptively realistic analysis of certain aspects of the
historical Gold Standard see e.g. Barro [1979), Eichengreen [1984,
1985a,b), Barsky and Summers [1985), Bordo and Schwartz £1984).2
These papers in turn were macroeconomic applications of the seminal
paper by Salant and Henderson E19781 on collapsing commodity stockpiling
schemes. My approach owes a lot to the work of Grilli (1986] who
analysed buying and selling attacks on the same currency in a small
country model.I use his idea of specifying two shadow floating
exchange rates, one governing a buying attack and one governing a
selling attack, although for the formal analysis in this paper I reduce
these two to a single shadow floating exchange rate between two
absorbing barriers. Flood and Garber (1983) use a log—linear continuous
time stochastic two—country model to analyse a different class of
problems (stochastic process switches) which could be formalized in
terms of the beha';iour of a stochastic process and a single absorbing
barrier.
Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 develops the
characterization of the "shadow floating exchange rate' as a Wiener
process, with or without drift, between two absorbing barriers. s long
as the shadow floating exchange rate stays between the barriers (in the
viable or safe range) the gold standard survives. When the shadow rate
reaches either barrier, the gold standard collapses through a
speculative selliig attack on one of the two currencies.
Section 4 looks at the various ways in which policy actions can
affect the shadow floating exchange rate process and thus the viability
of the gold standard. It considers in detail those policy actions that,
(leaving unchanged the nature of the shadow floating exchange rate
process as a Wiener process with drift -between two absorbing barriers3
and leaving unchanged the variance of that process), alter the width of
the viable range, the drift paramer (the instantaneous mean of the
process) and the initial value of the shadow rate. Sectionconsiders
feedback policies that turn the (non—stationary) Wiener process into a
stationary stochastic process. Section 6 looks at policies that can
alter directly the variance parameter of the original Wiener process.
2. The Model
The two country model to be analysed is a linearized version of the
•model given in equations (1) to (lO).2
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10) R > RMIN +RIN
Because the model include.s accounting identities as well as relative
price levels, there is no convenient log—linear specification.4
The two countries are assumed to have identical demand for money
functions (equations (1) and (2)). This permits us to analyse exchange
rate behaviour without having to specify a goods market equilibrium
condition. Starred variables refer to foreign country variables.i is
the nominal interest rate, y real output, M the nominal money stock, P
the price level, B the stock of government bonds, R the stock of foreign
exchange reserves, LI the primary (i.e. non—interest) government deficit
and S the spot exchange rate (the domestic currency price of foreign
currency). We assume i, i > 0. Interest is not paid on reserves, a
realistic assumption under a gold standard, when the domestic and
foreign currency prices of gold are fixed.
There is a single traded good. (3) is the law of one price.
Financial markets ar efficient and there are risk—neutral speculators,
so uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds, as given in (4).Et is the
expectation operator conditional on information available at time t.
The total stock of gold in the world economy is exogenously given.
Consumption and production of gold are therefore ignored.
Each country maintains convertibility of its currency into gold as
long as its stock of reserves exceeds an exogenously given critical
minimum value (RMIN for the home country, RJN for the foreign
country). If either country's stock of reserves falls to its lower
threshold, the fixed exchange rate regime collapses and a free float of
indefinite duration begins. Equation (10) states that there are enough5
global reserves to satisfy the two countries' minimal reqt.firements
simultaneously.3
Linearizing the model and evaluating it at the fixed exchange rate
S which, without loss of generality, can be set equal to unity, we
obtain the following first order differential equation for the floating
exchange rate:4
11) E dS(t) =S(t>d(t)—c.[M(t)—M*(t))dt+Z(t)dt t s
where
ha) ——iM > o
Si Pj0
Most of the analysis is concerned only with differences between the
values of country—specific variablessuch as domestic credit expansion,
money demand groth etc. It may be helpful to think of country—specific
or global variabes (real output, the world price level under a fixed
exchange rate) as not having any long—run trend. This makes the
standard convention in this literature of specifying reserve floors or
ceilings in nominal terms (rather than in real terms or relative to some
nominal scale variable such as nominal income, trade or financial
wealth) less objectionable. The analytically most convenient way of
specifying the world commodity market equilibrium condition required to
solve for individual countries' price levels and nominal interest rates,
is to postulate a fixed ex—ante real interest rate.
4 * Foralgebraic convenience we also assume that M =S11
0006
lib) =- l > 0
lic) Z(t)—ce11 e)0 (y(t) — y*(t))
-
Whena speculative selling attack against the home country's
currency occurs and the fixed exchange rate regime collapses at t =





D and are the home and foreign stocks of domestic credit
respectively, i.e. dD =(z+iB]dt —dB
When a speculative selling attack against the foreign country's
currency occurs and the fixed exchange rate regime collapses at t =
themoney stocks for t -r are given by:
(13a) M(t) =D(t)+R-
(13b)M*(t) =D*(t)+
FollowingGrilli [1986], equation (14a) describes the evolution of
9, the shadow floating exchange rate that would prevail for t ￿rif the7
fixed exchange rate regime collapses at t =ras the result of a
speculative selling attack against the home country's currency.
Equation (l4b) governs S, the shadow floating exchange rate that would
prevail for t ￿rif the fixed exchange rate collapses at tr as the
result of a speculative selling attack against the foreign currency.








An important simplifying assumption is that D(t) and D*(t) (and
indeed Z(t)) are unaffected by the occurrence and timing of a collapse
of either currency.







o(t-u) * — * (15b)S(t)
J
e Et[o(D(u) —D(U)+ R— —Z(u))du
t
The fixed exchange rate regime collapses through a speculative
selling attack on the home currency when the home currency shadow
floating exchange rate equals the fixed rate for the first time, i.e.8
when
(16a) S(t) =9;S(t') < 9, t' < t
It collapses as the result of a speculative selling attack on the
foreign currency when the foreign currency shadow floating exchange rate
equals the fixed rate for the first time, i.e. when
(16b) 9(t) =9;S(t') > 9, t' < t
The fixed exchange rate regime survives as long as
(17) S<SandS>S
Note from (15a, b) that
(18a) 9(t) =S(t)÷ K
Where
(18b) K =—- MIN+
RMIN)]
From the assumption of minimal global reserve adequacy (eqn(lO)) it
follows that K > 0 and therefore that9
(18c) 5(t) > 5(t)
We therefore rewrite condition (17) for viability of the fixed
exchange rate system as:
9(S (S+K
Without loss of generality we can choose the lower bound to equal
zero.5 Formally, the exercisewe are performing can therefore be seen
as the analysis of a continuous time stochastic process S between two
absorbing barriers; the lower barrier 0 and the upper barrier K > 0.
(19) 0<S<K
This is illustrated in Figure 1. S(t) represents a realization which
is absorbed at the upper barrier at t0. S1(t) is absorbed at the lower
barrier at t1.
Except in Section 5 we assume that dD, dD* and dZ are each governed
by mutually serially independent Brownian motion with drift t, i.e.
We can always replace expressions such as prob(S < S < S +K)with
the equivalent prob(0 < S —S< K), if we also change the initial








(20a) D(t) =D(0)++ wt)
(20b) D*(t) =D*(0)+pt+w*(t)
(20c) Z(t) =Z(0)+ + wz(t)
Given an initial condition, D, D* and Z will therefore be
continuous functions of time. The drift coefficients are p, and







The independent increments dw, dw*, dZ are not assumed to be
contemporaneously independent.(21) F(t)c(D(t) —D*(t)+R—
2RIN)
—Z(t)




(22b) =G (c+2)+ +
Itsinitial value is
(22c) F(O) (D(O) —D*(O)+R—2RIN) —Z(O)
From (15a) and the definition of F(t) in (21) it follows that










Therefore,S(t) is a Wiener process. Its drift is
1 cr * (24a) =— — (p-p) -—
Itsvariance parameter is
(2
2 12I'MII221 12 4b) °S2°F 1+0 t+_-O+_r.(c 1i t
Itsinitial value is
* * *
(24c)S(O)= s=F(O)+ =cc(D(O)D (O)+R_2RMIN)—Z(O) c1(p—p
Ocy o2
Theexpected value of the shadow floating exchange rate is
therefore driven up by the excess of the home country trend rate of
domestic credit expansion, p, over the foreign trend rate of domestic
* creditexpansion p and by the excess of the foreign trend rate of
change of money demand over the home country trend rate c-fchangeof
money demand, —p7.13
3. The Gold Standard as a Wiener Process With Two Absorbing Barriers.
From the characterization of S as a Wiener process between two
absorbing barriers, a number of propositions follow immediately.
Proposition 1. Under the conditions specified in Section 2, the
gold standard collapses in finite time (with probability 1).
Proof. A Wiener process, with or without drift (i.e. with
0), between two absorbing barriers is absorbed with probability 1
in finite time. See e.g. 3. M. Harrison [1985, p. 43].
Note that the variante of the shadow floating exchange rate
increases without bound as t increases. Any gold standard with a finite
global stock of gold reserves will be non—viable, in the sense that a
speculative attack will exhaust one country's reserves with probability
one in finite time.
It is important to note that, at a point in time, the 'fundamental'
shocks to domestic credit and money demand are infinitesimal, i.e. of
measure zero compared to the stock of reserves at that instart. It
always takes a finite amount of time to achieve a finite change in the
stock of reserves through the cumulative effect of these shocks. The
finite, stock—shift rundown in a country's stock of reserves at the
moment a speculative attack occurs, reflects the .endogenous behaviour of
speculators, not the occurrence of an exogenous shock that is large
relative to thc existing stock of reserves.1k
An implication of this specification of the exogenous shocks is
that neither currency will ever be at a forward discount or premium, as
long as the gold standard survives. At the instant a speculative attack
brings down the gold standard, a forward discount or premium consistent
with UIP may of course emerge.
Let r be the time at which the gold standard collapses, either
•because S reaches K > 0 or because it reaches 0. Let 5(0)S0 €[Q, K)
be the initial value of Sat t =0and let and be the drift and
variance parameter of S. p(S0, s; U is the conditional probability
that S is at S at time t > 0 given.that it starts at S0 at time t =0,
when there are two absorbing barriers, at K > 0 and at 0, and with
0 < S0 < K. Then (see Cox and Miller t1965, p. 219—234])







-— 1r- () =-
+
2K
G(t), the probability that S is absorbed no later than time t (i.e. prob




Note that g(t) G'(t) =_Jp(S0
5; t)dS is the probability density
function of r.
The moment generating function of T is
* —vt
g (v) =j e g(t) dt for v 0.
0
The moments of r(suchas the first moment E0(r)) are found by
differentiating g*(v) w.r.t. v,since16
(27) E0(T)=(_1)flg*
=
Forthe Wiener process with drift variance parameter upper
absorbing barrier K and lower absorbing barrier 0 < K, starting at
Kev S0e1(v) Ke1(v)' S0&2(v)
(28a) ,,*(v) =L1e )e —l—e )e





(28b) &1(v), e2(v) = 2
Os
From (27) and (28a, b) we derive the expected duration of the
interval until the collapse given in (29, a, b).
SØ(K —S) 8 (29a)E0(T) = 2
=0
as
8(29a) is derived from (29b) by applying L'-4ospital's rule twice.17
1 2. El —exp(—2u..S/ >3






Finally(see e.g. Cox and Miller [1965, p. 233]), the probability of
absorption at the upper barrier (i.e. the probabilityofthe gold
standard collapsing through a speculative selling attack on the home









The probability of absorption at the lower barrier 21(S0), is then of
course given by
(30b> u(S0) =1u(S0).
4. Monetary, Financial and Fiscal Policy ctLons and the Viability
of the Gold Standard.
No attention is paid in this paper to strateg2c behaviour by the
monetary and fiscal authorities of the two countries. It is probably
easiest to think of the various policy actions as being implemented by18
mutual agreement or co—operatively; formally, we simply vary policy
parameters in an exogenously given manner without worrying about
conjectured and actual responses of other policy makers, time
consistency of the actions or rules etc. Consideration of those very
important issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
We distinguish 5 different kinds of policy actions.
a> Policies that change the initial value or starting value of the
shadow floating exchange rate process at t =0,S.
b) Policies that change the drift of the shadow floating exchange rate
process, p.
C) Policies that change the width of the "safe or viable band", K.
d) Policies that change the S process from a Wiener process with drift
2 and variance parameter to a stationary first order linear




dw NIID (0, adt)
e) Policies that change the variance parameter of the S process,
It will become clear that any given policy action or rule change
may bring about several of these five consequences atthe same time.




Oir(S0) exp(-2S0/)> 0 if
1 —exp(—2i.K/o5)
Clearly, policies that raise S increase the probability of the collapse








Clearly, policies that widen the viable band by raising the upper
limit reduce the probability of the collapse of the gold standard
occurring through a selling attack on the home currency.
Note from the definition of K in (1Gb) that an increase in Krneans
an increase in the global stock of reserves and/or a reduction in the
countries' critical reserve thresholds. Since the e>periment holds S0
constant (and theincrease in A or reduction in RMIN or RIN must20
be accompanied by a reduction in D(O) or an increase in D*(0) (see 24c>.
Such a combination of events obviously makes it more likely that the
collapse, when it occurs, will occur through a run on the foreign
currency. The increase in world reserves is allocated to the home
country.
The effects of an increse in and of an increase in p9 on


















The effect of policies that raise S, K, and on the expected
duration of the period for which the gold standard survives are given in








aS ?-L 2 2
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exp(—2p5K/a5>]
aE0(r)S0 (33b)< =——->O if=O
Cs
9From(29a), E0r) > 0 =>—S0(l
—exp(—2K/o))
+K(l—exp(—2S0/a))






Therefore Q < 0 and A < 0.22
dE0(r)(1-










aE0(r)= (33d) 0 if p =0
äp9
3E0(T) 1Er+Al (33d') =
op6 i
Equation(33a) shows that when there is zero drift raising the
starting value S will raise (lower) E0(r) if S0 is below (above) the
halfway mark of the survival range, i.e. for S0 < -(S >
If
p9 (33a') tells us that the effect on E0(T) of an increase inS0
1%
ispositive for 0 < S < S0 ,negativefor S0 < S0 ￿K ,whereS0 is
3E CT,




the effect on E0(r) in the absence of any uncertainty .Thesecond
term on the RHS of (33a') always has the opposite sign of the first
term. It decreases with S0, regardless of the sign of
When p6= Owidening the width of the viable range by raising its
upper limit, K, obviously lengthens the expected survival period,(33b).
The same holds when 0 (33b').t'
That a higher value of the variance parameter reduces the expected
duration of the gold standard's survival is not surprising (33 c, ci).
10 if >0
In that case Tisnon—stochastic and given by T=
ps<0
Forthe case p60, first consider > 0. The sign of (33b') is
always the sign of 1 —exp(—2p9K/o)
El +(2p6K/o)].
We know that if x
> 0 and misany positive interger, then








>0. For the case p6 < 0 we know that if x0, m is any positive





0 < x < 1, we find el —x>< 1 and again > 0. For
as
2p6K äE0(T)
the case p6<0 and 1 +2
< 0, the result that > 0
as
obvious.24
A higher value of the drift parameter p6 appears to have an ambiguous
effect on E0(r). Without uncertainty,.an increase in p6 will raise
E0(r) if p6 is negative,, lower E0(r) if is ositive. With
uncertainty, the two terms in the square brackets on the RHS of (33d)
T)
have opposite signs and more information is needed to sign
We now consider alternative policy actions at t =0,that maximize
the expectation of the survival period of the gold standard.
Policies that Increase K.
From (l8b> it is apparent that, given the values of the parameters
and the viable range of S can be increased only by an increase in
the exogenous global stock of reserves R or a lowering of the critical
reserve thresholds R and R*. .From(24c) we note that an increase
mm mm
in R or a reduction in R*.
12will raise S by half as much as K. 9(0)
mm 0
is kept constant when R is increased and D(0) —D*(O)tor !__p6] is s.
reduced by half the amount of the increase in R. If the lower bound of
the viable range were L < K rather than zero, we could represent a
"symmetric" increase in the viable range by an eqeal increase in the
upper bound K and reduction in the lower bound L. Such a policy would
leave S0 unchanged for given values of D, and p6•
12 *
It was assumed, in (24c) that R R
mm ann25
In our model, an increase in K accompanied by an increase in S0 of
half the magnitude of the rise in K can be achieved either by equal
reductions in A and or by an increase in R that is distributed
mm mm
equally between the two countries. An increase in K with constant S0
and constant requires an increase in D*(0) and/or reduction in 0(0).
Take the example of an increase in 0 (0) which neutralizes the effect of
an increase in R on S. earring helicopter manoeuvres, such a
stock—shift increase in D* can only be brought about through an open
market purchase of bonds by the foreign government, since
* ** * *
dD=[Li +i B]dt—dB.
As a smaller stock of foreign government bonds is now outstanding,
government debt service will be less as a result of the open market
purchase than it would otherwise have been thy idB* approximately).
Unless the government now continues (flow) purchases of its debt or
*
increasesits primary deficit Li by the amount of the reduction in debt
*
service,its expected rate of domestic credit expansion u dt will be
lowered, resulting in increases in and Indefinitegovernment
bond purchases (or sales) are not feasible. (n increase in K with
constant S0 and p5, therefore, represents a combination of an increase
in world reserves (or reductions in reserve thresholds), an open market
sale by the home country government (or an open market purchase by the
foreign government) and a reduction in the home government's primary
deficit (or an increase in the foreign government's primary deficit).
(See Buiter [1976] for a discussion of these issues in a small country
setting).26
We can summarize the main findings of the. discussion of increases
in K as follows.
Proposition 2. A larger global stock of gold reserves raises the
length of the expected survival period of the gold standard. Collapse
in finite time remains a certainty, however, with any finite stock of
reserves.
Policies That Change S
I now consider policies that change S0 without causing changes in
K, or c. It is easily seen from (24c), (18b) and (24a) and (24b)
that such policies are redictributions of the given global stock of
gold. An increase in D(0) —D*(0)redistributes reserves from the home
country to the foreign country and raises Such stock—shift changes
in D(0) or D*(0) are brought about by open market sales or purchases.
To prevent changes in from resulting from such open market sales or
purchases, fundamental fiscal corrections, i.e. changes in the primary
deficit must be brought out, as discussed in the preceding subsection.
Given K, and there exists a unique value of S0, (and therefore
a unique value of D(0) —D*(0))that maximizEs E0(r). This is obtained
13 from (33a ).
13









2exp(—2pS0/) (34') —=—K if 0
Cl —exp(-2JK/3)]
The problem with such redistributions of world reserves is that
even when they raise E0(r) (something both countries can agree on), the
probability of the collapse of the gold standard, when it occurs,
occurring through a speculative selling attack on currency X always
increases (decreases) when country X gives up (acquires) reserves
through the open market sales and purchases outlined above.If there is
any opprobrium attached to succombing to a speculative sellingattack,
countries that have excessive reserves (from the point of view of the
survival of the gold standard) may yet be loath to give them up. This
leads to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. There exists an E0(r) maximizing initial
distribution of reserves defined by (34,34'),'24c) and
*
R(0)=D(0) —D(0)+R14Since any reserve ridistribution tncreases
14With identical money demand functions, identical initial income
levels, a fixed exchange rate S1 and UIP, it follows that M(0) =
M*(0).Since M =D+Rand M*D* +R—R,Proposition 3 follows.28
the likelihood of the collapse of the gold standard, when it occurs,
occurring through a selling attack on the currency of the country that
has given up reserves, co—operative redistributions of reserves may be
difficult to achieve without a mechanism for compensating the loser.
Policies that Change .
From(24a) it is apparent that an increase in the difference
between the expected rates of change Of the home country's and the
foreign country's stocks of domestic credit, increases .Anincrease
in p — whichraises would, however, also raise S0 (see (24c)),
which is an increasing function of the "present discounted value" of all
future expected dce differentials.
To raise without also raising S0. the increase in p —mustbe
accompanied by a reduction in D(0) —D*(0),i.e.
(35) d(D—D ) =
Notethat an open market sale by the home government (say) which is
not acompanied by a reduction in the primary deficit and is not
followed by further borrowing, lowers D but, through the increased debt
service requiremtnts, raises p by dp —i0dD. A once—off open market
sale by the home government therefore raises p5 and will raise (lower)
if i0 > a3 (i0 < a9).
It does not appear to be correct that p5= 0always maximizes
E0(r) for given values of S0 (and K and ).E.g.with a value of29
very close to the lower end of the viable range, 0, a positive value of
p9mightwell raise E0(T).I conjecture, but have not been able to
prove, that when both and S0 are the subject of policy choice,
however, E0(r) is maximized when p5 =0and S0
Note that this requires
* —l
15



























which seems ambiguous. Only2
given in fn. 13 can be signed
as0
1 -
unambiguously.p9= 0and = dosatisfy the first order
conditions for an interior extremum.30
and
D(0) -D*(0>= Z(0)— + 2R*
Eoç oc MIN
To achieve these combined targets for the initial stocks of
*
domesticcredit D(0) —D(0) and for subsequent trend or expected dce's
—p.7, wil.lin general require using both once—off open market
purchases or sales and a choice of (relative) primary deficits—
Therefore:
Proposition '.TheE0(T) maximizing selection of and S can be
achieved only by using both monetary and fiscal policy instruments.
Note that only if == 0will the gold standard not run into
reserve exhaustion problems. In that case the- value of is immaterial
as long as it is in the interior of the viable range.
5. Policies That chieve a Stationary Shadow ExchanQe Rate Process
Thus far the stochastic process governing the forcing variables D,
and Z (given in 20a, b, c) and the stochastic process governing the
shadow floating exchange rate S (given in (23)) have been Wiener
processes with drift. Such processes are non—stationary. Specifically,
with a constant variance parameter and drift p, S(t) =S(0)+t
+
w6(t)where dw9(t)NIID(0, odt).31
The variance of 5(t) therefore increases linearly with t and S is
nonstationary even if =0.
We maintain the assumption that Z(t) is governed by the Wiener
process with drift given in (2Cc), but permit the policy instruments to
be governed by linear feedback rules that relate dce to the state
variable S. For simplicity we assume that the feedback rules are exact
or non—stochastic, i.e. that the only sources of noise in the system are
the money demands in the two countries, Z(t>. D(t) and D*(t) can be




(36) dF(t) S(t)dt +
dwF16
where dwF NIID(0, 4dt.
The first order representation of the shadow exchange rate -equation
(14b) and the feedback rule (36) is given in (37)
16
Note that in tjeneral, dF(t) =d(D(t)—D*(t))_dZ(t) =
cd(D(t)—D(t)) —dt—dw.Thenon—stochastic linear feedback rule
In z
d(D —D*)=-S(t)dt+-dtachieves (36), where w =—w
F Z
In m32





The characteristic equation of this dynamic system has one unstable
root (p2 > 0) and one stable root (p1 < 0) i.f.f.cc. > 0. Assumina this
condition to be satisfied, the solution for the non—predetermined











The second term one might expect on the R.H.S. of (38),
-r)








Itis therefore rather straightforward (technically) tc design dce
feedback rules that turn the original non—stationary shadow exchange
rate process into the stationary process given in (39). The fact that
(39) is stationary does not, however, resolve the problem of
non—viability of the gold standard.
Proposition 5.
The gold standard whbse shadow exchange rate is governed by the
stationary process in (39) will collapse in finite time with probability
•1.
Proof: The first order linear stochastic differential equation
whose forcing variable is a Wiener process is known as the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O.U.) process. In Cox and Miller Cl95, p. 23343 it
is shown that the stationary O.U. process is recurrent, i.e. any state
is reached from any other state in finite time with probability 1.
•Hence given any nitial state S0, 0 < < K, the barriers will be
reached in finite time with probability one. This proposition can be
extended to higher order stationary linear stochastic processes with
constant coefficients.34
6. Flexible dce Rules and the Viability of a Gold Standard
From equation (15b) it is apparent that there exist policies for D
and that ensure that the shadow floating exchange rate will never
break through its upper or lower barrier. Policies that fix S at any
value between 0 and K preclude a speculative run on either currency. To
achieve this, both the drift p5 (given in (2'+a) and the variance
parameter o (given in (24b)) must be set equal to zero. To set the
drift equal to zero does not require any special technical ability of
the policy makers. Any values of p and satisfying p —= —will
do, and the policy can be specified in an open—loop or non—contingent
manner.
To reduce the variance parameter to zero, however, requires a
highly contingent or conditional policy rule. It is e.g. not sufficient
for the authorities merely to refrain from adcing additional 'noise' to
the systern, by following a non—stochastic open—lpop rule with
2 200 0 0 0 0.
p p11ww w*w2
ww*
From (24b> this would leave the variance of the shadow exchange
rate process at --4 >0 if, as seems certait,, there are stochastic
shocks to relative money demand growth. For to equal zero, D(t)
and/or D11(t) must be stochastic, (a2 and/or > 0) with one or more of p
covariance parameters a ,a ,anda cnosen to satisfy
ww ww*
=0in (24b'. Equivalently, instantaneous feedback rules must be
designed which ensure that the forcing variable in the shadow exchange
rate process is constant over time, i.e. that dF(t) =0or35
(40) d(D(t> —D*(t))—dZ(t) for all t.
This perfect automatic stabilizer instantaneously matches any
(random) excess of home country money demand growth over foreign country
money demand growth with an equal excess of home country domestic credit
expansion over foreign country domestic credit expansion. There never
is any net movement of reserves between the two monetary authorities.
Fiscal fspects of DCE Rules Consistent With the Survival of a Gold
Standard
From the two government budget identities (5) and (6), it follows
that, as long as the fixed exchange rate regime survives and i =i,
* * * *
d(D—D) =(—)dt+i(B—B)dt —d(B—B)
Under the dce rule given in (40), this means that
(41) d(B —B*)=E(—A*)+i(B—B*))dt—dZ(t)
Even if the authorities follow the very conservative fiscal policy
of matching (differences in) debt service i(B —B*)with (differences
in) primary surplu'es (( —icr, relativestocks of public sector debt
will still Hget out of hand," since in that case36
(42) d(B —B*)=——dZ
i.e. relative public debts is a Wiener process (without drift). The
stabilization of the shadow exchange rate appears to be achieved only at
the expense of the destabilization of the public debts of the two
countries.
We assume that each country has an upper bound on its public debt,
B for the home country and B* for the foreign country. B > B means a
* —*
homecountry default on its public debt; B > B means insolvency of the
foreign government.
Thus far we have characterized, in (40) and (42), the behaviour of
D — andB —B*. benchmark 'tsymmetric' specification of the
behaviour of each of the national authorities which is consistent with
(40) is that each country's dce equals the growth in the demand for that
country's money due to real output growth, i.e.
(43a) dD(t) =— —- (&1e )dy(t) c 1yO m
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Such an upper bound exists when there is no Ricardian debt
neutrality, the nominal interest rate exceeds the growth rate of nominal
taxable capacity and there are limits on the magnitude of the future
primary surpluses and the future flow of seigniorage revenues that can
be achieved. more general model would specify these limits in terms
of e.g. public debt —nationalincome ratios, but nothing crucial is
lost if we interpret our model as one characterized by zero long run
real growth and inflation [see also fn3].37
(43b) dD*(t) =—-— (e1 e )dy*(t)
19
a 1yO m
Where y(t) and Y*(t) are governed by Brownian motion.
A5sume each country follows the fiscal policy rule of equating its
primary surplus and the interest cost of servicing its public debt, i.e.
a strict balanced budget rule;
(4a)+iB=0
(44b) +iB*=0
Given (43a, b) and (4L+a, b) each country's real output—related
money demand shocks will be reflected in open market purchases orsales
of public debt, i.e.
(1.5a) dB =L. cc1 e )dy a 1yO m
and
(45b) dB* =— e e )dy*
cc 1yO
m
19Note, from (lic) that Z(t) =—cc1e)0 (y(t) —y*(t)).38
A policy of accommodating shocks to money demand due to variations
in real output (thus avoiding any net flow of international reserves and
fixing S) and of balancing the budget (44a,b)will therefore result in
the national debt following a Wiener process if real output follows a
Wiener process.
If the Wiener process for y (y*) has no drift, then B (B*) will
exceed any finite upper limit with probability 1 in finite time, and the
authorities will have to default on their debt. If y (y ) has negative
drift, it is true a fortiori that any finite upper bound on B (B*) will
be reached in finite time with probability 1.If y (y*) has positive
drift> 0 (*> 0)then the probability that, starting from B (B)






where = Ay < 0
and2=L 2
(See J. M. Harrison t1985, p. 43]). While B 1yO Y
this probability is less than 1, the probability that B (B*) wIll reach
an arbitrarily low (even negative) value in finite time is 1 when
> 0 > 0). This possibility of the government becoming an
arbitrarily large creditor to the private sector is certainly an unusual
one.
If the government were to run a budget deficit (surplus) equal to
the trend growth in money demand due to real output growth, (44 a, b)
would be replaced by39
(4L')+ j=!. ce.1e )p a 1YOy
** —1 —l
(4'.b') +iB=— e. e )p a 1yOy* m
Such a financing policy (a balanced budget policy corrected for
non—inflationary seigniorage) takes the drift out of the nationaldebt
processes (45 a, b) which now become Wiener processeswithout drift. As
was pointed out already, this. liconservativehl open—looprule entails
government default in finite time with probability one.The risk of a
foreign exchange crisis is eliminated, but an eventual government
solvency crisis has become a certainty.
To ensure that the critical gold reserve thresholds will not be
violated and that debt default is ruled out, the primary deficit 1
will have to be varied in response to exogenous shocks. The simplest
policy that guarantees survival of the gold standard and government
solvency is one where the primary deficit adjusts continuouslyto
accommodate all real income—related changes in money demand, i.e.
- —l
(44a") (E 4-.iB)dt=— — (. )dy a 1yO
in
•and
(44b") (*+ iB*)dt=— L (ee )dy* a 1yO
in40
tinder this set of policy rules (43 a, b); (44 a", b") dR_dR* =0and
dB =dB*=0.International liquidity and public sector solvency are
made certain by adopting a set of highly contingent or conditional dce
and primary deficit rules.
While the rule given here is not the only one consistent with a
viable gold standard and government solvency, any viable rule must be
capable of eliminating the posibility that independent shocks will
cumulate in ways that threaten lower or upper bounds on certain asset
stocks. Another policy which rules out the possibility of running out
of gold reserves and which does not require the instantaneous matching
of dce and money demand changes, is to let reserves decline freely to
some given level a5ove the minimum threshold level (RMIN +r,r > 0 for
the home country, say) and to engage in a stock—shift open market sale
of government bonds whenever RMIN +ris reached. The open market—sale
would restore reserves to +r',r' > r, say. If both countries
were to pursue such a policy, the process governing the shadow floating
exchange rate would become a Wiener process between reflecting barriers.
To prevent these discrete open market sales from cumulating into
unsustainable public debt growth, the primary deficit will have to
respond to variations in debt service. This mean that all viable rules
are feedback, contingent or conditional rules.I summarize this as:
Proposition .
Inorder to rule out both the collapse of the gold standard and a
public sector solvency crisis, both monetary policy (dce or stock—shiftL4i
openmarket operations) and fiscal policy (variations in the primary
deficit) will have to be specified through contingent or conditional
r u I es.
Cone lus ion
The idealized two—country gold standard studied in this paper turns.
out to lack long—run viability unless monetary and fiscal policy are
used very flexibly to offset the effects of independent exogenous shocks
on international reserves and the public debt.
Absent a flexible dee policy which offsets the effect of money
demand shocks on the stock of reserves, the gold standard collapses in
finite time with probability 1. This collapse occurs through a
speculative selling attack against one of the two countries' currencies,
which brings that country's stock of gold reserves to its critical
minimal threshold level. 4hen this happens the monetary authority ends
convertibility of the currency ircto gold at a fixed parity and a period
of free floating commences.
Even when an eventual collapse is certain, there are once-off
monetary and fiscal policy actions that can raise the expected duration
of the li-fe of the gold standard. An increase in the exogenous stock
o-f international reserves (through a gold discovery or through the
issuing of 'paper gold" (S.D.R.'s) by a supranational monetary
authority> raises the expected survival period of the gold standard.
For any given global stock of reserves, there exists an initial
distribution of reserves that maximizes the gold standard's expected42
lifetime. This distribution can be achieved through (stock—shift) open
market operations and adjustments in public sector primary non—interest
deficits. Expected dce (the 'drift" of the domestic credit stock
process) can be adjusted by the monetary authorities to alter the
Hdriftl• of international reserves and of the "shadow floating exchange
rate" whose behaviour determines the timing of the collapse and the
currency that will be the subject of a selling attack.
The behaviour of international reserves in the "viable range" where
each country's stock of reserves exceeds its critical threshold value,
can in general be mapped into the behaviour of a shadow floating
exchange rate between two absorbing barriers. The results summarized
thus far hold for a world in which the exogenous variables (domestic
credit and money demand) follow Wiener processes with or without drift.
When the exogenous variables are governed by Wiener processes, the
shadow exchange rate is also a Wiener process. Since Wiener processes
are non—stationary, it may be thought that the certainty of collapse in
finite time is duet to that specific feature of the model. This is not
the case. Fairly simple dce feedback rules relating national dce
differences to the level of the shadow floating exchange rate can
transform the shadow floating exchange rate proces into a stationary
stochastic process. The proposition that a critical reserve threshold
will be breached in finite time with probability 1 remains valid even
for stationary shadow exchange rate processes.
Finally, I consider flexible dce rules which permit domestic credit
expansion to respond instantaneously to real income—related money demand43
shocks. While this stops the movement of reserves, it will create
public debt problems. If e.g. the authorities follow a balanced budget
policy, money demand shocks will, when matched by variations in domestic
credit, be reflected one-for—one in the public tebt. If there is an
upper bound on the level of public debt consistent with government
solvency, this upper bound is likely to be breached eventually. If the
authorities follow a budgetary policy of running a deficit or surplus
equal to the trend growth of money demand (i.e. equal to the trend
non—inflationary seigniorage that can be raised) a solvency crisis is
certain in finite time.
To prevent both reserve thresholds and public debt ceilings from
being breached, flexible dce policy and a flexible use of the primary
(non—interest) public sector deficit are required in this model.
Viability of the idealized gold standard analysed here requires the
active and flexible support of monetary and fiscal policy. Even prima
facie 'sound' unconditional monetary and fiscal rules such as : no
sterilization of balance—of payments deficits or surpluses and a
balanced budget, are inconsistent with the gold standard's long—run
survival. This vulnerability of the gold standard should not come asa
surprise of those who have studied the theory and history of commodity
stabilization schemes which attempt to stabilize the price of some
commodity by purchasing for or selling from a. buffer stock. Formally,
the gold standird is essentially an extreme version of such a commodity
stabilization scheme, as it aims not merely to stabilize but to fix the
price of a commodity. The same laws of probability that cause the4,4
eventualcollapse of commodity stabilization schemes, mostrecentlyin
the case of tin, jeopardize the long—run viability of a gold standard.
An issue which remains to be investigated is the extent to which
the conclusions of this paper carry over to the case where international
reserves consist (perhaps in part) of the liabilities of one or more of
the national monetary authorities and carry a market—determined rate of
interest. .Jhen reserves can be borrowed with little or no financial
penalty, the distinction between liquidity crises and solvency crises
becomes blurred, and we should only expect to see a run on a nation's
currency as one aspect of a default crisis affecting the whole of that
nation's public debt.45
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